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Freedman: Habeas by Any Other Name

HABEAS BY ANY OTHER NAME
Eric M Freedman*
I am most grateful to Melinde Sanborn and Professor William E.
Nelson for their work on a fascinating case which has enriched my
thinking regarding the major project now engaging me and enabled me
to put together a few preliminary ideas. Ms. Sanborn, of course,
unearthed the case in the first place, thereby providing an additional
source that I plan to use in the project, while Professor Nelson raised a
provocative question about the purpose for which I plan to use it.
Thanks to the generosity of the Hofstra administration, I spent the
academic 2008-2009 year on a research leave at the New Hampshire
State Archives in Concord doing research into the roots of habeas
corpus. As I write up the findings,t one proposal I intend to advance is
that, for many purposes at least, to look only at "habeas corpus" is to
look too narrowly. I have uncovered precisely parallel cases of
petitioners' release from imprisonment by means of a variety of writs,
including certiorari,' supersedeas, and prohibition-even in cases where
they had originally asked for no particular writ at all.
* Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra University
School of Law (LAWEMF@Hofstra.edu). B.A. 1975, Yale University; M.A. 1977, Victoria
University of Wellington (New Zealand); J.D. 1979, Yale University. Although I will do so at
length in a later publication, it is not too early to express my deep gratitude for the extraordinary
assistance I received while conducting my research at the New Hampshire State Archives from
Frank C. Mevers, the State Archivist, Brian Nelson Burford, the State Records Manager, and Milli
S. Knudsden, the New Hampshire independent scholar who first suggested to Ms. Sanborn that her
work might overlap with my own.
t All documents cited in this Article are available on request from the Barbara and Maurice
A. Deane Law Library at the Hofstra University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Pearse v. March, (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 1770), in SUPERIOR COURT DOCKET
BOOK 1767-70, 459-62 (n.p. n.d.) (on file with the New Hampshire State Archives) (granting
interim release and ultimate vacatur of proceedings by a writ of certiorari to petitioner imprisoned
for contempt).
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The 1745 case of Downer ex rel. Mason v. Gilman exemplifies the
last three situations simultaneously.2 Andrew Downer, a British soldier,
was imprisoned in connection with a suit for debt in violation of an act
of Parliament exempting active duty service members from such
imprisonments.3 His superior officer, Jonathan Tuften Mason, filed a
petition praying simply that "your worships would put the Act of
Parliament in force, by releasing and setting the Andrew Downer at
liberty, that his Maj. Service may not suffer thereby.'A The court
responded by first issuing a supersedeas to halt the debt proceedings,
thereby securing Downer's immediate release, and then a writ of
prohibition against their further continuance.5 In the early 1800s,
soldiers would gain release under the corresponding American statute
through writs of habeas corpus. 6
Similarly alleged slaves might claim their freedom by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and find it treated as a writ of
trespass on the case,7 or an action for replevin.8
Although it may sometimes be possible to put forth cogent
explanations for these differences, the question of why the litigant chose
one writ over another is (a) somewhat antiquarian in many contexts; 9 (b)
in many instances futile because of the informality of colonial legal
practice;1o and (c) one on which nothing particularly turned when the

2. Downer ex rel. Mason v. Gilman, No. 21242 (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 1745), in NEW
HAMPSHIRE STATE ARCHIVES SUPERIOR COURT MINUTES 1744-45, Box 1 (on file with the New
Hampshire State Archives).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id
6. Three such cases, from 1814, 1822, and 1832 are described in ERIC M. FREEDMAN,
HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 42-43 (2001). Another example is In
re Mills (N.H. Strafford County Ct. Dec. 18, 1819) (Folder 11) (on file with the New Hampshire
State Archives).
7. See, e.g, Johnson v. Massey (N.H. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 1748), in SUPERIOR COURT AUG.
1744 THROUGH AUG. 1748, at 341-42 (n.p. n.d.) (on file with the New Hampshire State Archives).
8. Tarr v. Nung (N.H. Super. Ct. Feb. 1751), in SUPERIOR COURT SEPT. 1750 THROUGH
MARCH 1754, at 87-88 (n.p. n.d.) (on file with the New Hampshire State Archives).
Of course the filing of a habeas corpus petition by a putative slave commonly gave rise to
a habeas action of the usual sort. For examples, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE
COURTROOM: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN CASES 25, 121, 258 (1985).

9. Much recent interest in common law habeas corpus has been spurred by Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), which held that the statutory procedure for Guantinamo detainees to
test their imprisonments were invalid under the Suspension Clause for failure to provide rights
commensurate with common law habeas. Researchers who share that interest certainly ought to
adopt the functional definition of habeas corpus that I describe in the text.
10. Professor Nelson's ongoing survey of colonial law emphasizes this point. See I WILLIAM
E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW INCOLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND,

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/7

2

Freedman: Habeas by Any Other Name

2009]

HABEAS BYANY OTHER NAME

277

issue was a potentially wrongful imprisonment, an issue which
invariably led the courts to cut through whatever technicalities they
might otherwise have been inclined to enforce.
That is why I suggested to Ms. Sanborn that Zipporah's petition in
which she does "humbly beseech this honored Court, to call her before
you, and to deal with her, as to yo wisedomes and mercy shall see meet,
that she may not lye where she is to perrish"" might plausibly be called
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even though it does not use those
words and a lawyer might classify the document otherwise.12
The critical element is that this is a demand for release from
unlawful imprisonment, a demand which, as indicated, could be made in
the colonies by invoking many writs or none at all.
One element unifying the situations, I will propose in my more
extended work, is the seriousness with which the judicial system treated
them. In Zipporah's case, she got exactly what she was entitled to:
submission of the charges to a grand jury and her release when it
declined to press them.' 3
More generally, it is in cases alleging wrongful imprisonment that
one sees in paradigmatic form what we today describe as common law
methodology, characterized by a strong focus on a speedy and pragmatic
resolution based on the specific facts at hand rather than any impetus to
pronounce broad rules of law.
For these and other reasons, I believe that in many contexts a
functional rather than a formal definition of habeas corpus is justified
and that a demand, however denominated, challenging the legal basis of
a detention should lie for research purposes within the domain of habeas
corpus.

1607-1660, at 37, 69-71, 92 (2008); William E. Nelson, Legal Turmoil in a Factious Colony: New
York, 1664-1776, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 69, 149 (2009).
11. Melinde Lutz Sanborn, The Case of the Headless Baby: Did Interracial Sex in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony Lead to Infanticide and the Earliest Habeas Corpus Petition in
America?, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, app. at 270, document 2 (2009).
12. Thus, Professor Nelson suggests that it might equally well be considered a motion to
expedite the proceedings. See William E. Nelson, Remarks, Categorizing Zipporah's Petition, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 279, 282 (2009).
13. It would seem, as Professor Nelson suggests, that she also received just the same process
that a white defendant would have. Id at 280-81. My only question would be whether it took longer
to give her that process than would have been usual in the case of a white defendant.
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